The Turkish Army is ever-present politically, less as an adviser and executive arm of the Government helping with the planning and execution of public decisions but more as an arbiter of influence placed at the very heart of the social order’s nervous system, to quote Durkheim. It is also an historic force, as the actor which generated the State and gave it substance; one is reminded of the celebrated phrase of von Seekt that the Reichswehr was ‘. . . not only at the service of the State–it is the State’. Finally, the cultural mission of providing a framework and training to the entire State is entrusted to its officers; the reality of this may be debated these days, but military rhetoric and imagination leave little doubt as to the theory. The whole question of the military in Turkey is strangely discreet in the social sciences. The main aim of this article is to examine the reality of military influence in Turkey, and to bring out its main aspects.
The Turkish Army: Military Power, Civil Power
Whatever the national or international imperatives that confront a modern army, the facts of history play a major role in how it sees itself and the image it projects to society as a whole. Turkey’s military institution as it appears today has developed over the years from the original model based on those armies which had the greatest reputation (mass armies) at the time that the Ottoman Empire undertook the modernisation of its Army.
History of the Relationship Between the Army and its Rulers
1789-1923: Restructuring
The characteristic of this period is the start of the restructuring process of the Ottoman Empire’s military apparatus; its main objective was to professionalise the officer corps, and make it independent of the power structure and capable of rivalling its opponents in equipment, training and efficiency. This was the magic formula of the Ottoman bureaucracy when confronted by a weak and insubordinate imperial army, with constant trouble from the janissaries.
The paradox of the Ottoman military renewal(1) was that it opened the door to the entrance of the military into the Ottoman political scene, by creating a modern army trained in the new techniques of warfare in an empire which was already crumbling; this was despite its aim (whether official policy or not) of separating the military from politics. The result was an awakening of political consciousness which developed in parallel with a military renewal.
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