In recent months the defence of Europe against ballistic missiles has become a hot topic in the newspapers and on television under the more dramatic heading ‘anti-missile shield’. The media are in fact just continuing what has been in progress for several years for the specialists working on the subject since the launch of the NATO territorial defence feasibility study in 2004. Their initial work has shown that behind the complexities of the problem there are both technical and operational answers. The aim of this article is to outline the key issues and to help clarify the current debate.

At the 2002 Prague summit, the Atlantic Alliance Heads of State and Government decided to carry out a feasibility study aimed at looking at options for protection of territory, forces and population centres from threats related to ballistic missiles. Eighteen months later, an international industrial team, including Astrium from France, published an initial detailed analysis of technical feasibility, possible engagement modes, the best architectures available and a possible programme. The Riga summit at the end of 2006 ratified a position of ‘wait and see’, since although the technical feasibility was recognised, further approval was given only for work on the political and military implications of missile defence.

This position, of neither rejection nor commitment, was aimed at containing US pressure, but only lasted about two months until, on 22 January 2007, the United States made official its bilateral negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic on the installation of interceptors and a tracking radar. This US commitment has three immediate consequences that are today influencing Allied initiatives on missile defence. First, that of rekindling debate within nations and NATO circles on the consequences of a project in which, like it or not, they could be involved. The second is the creation of a public confrontation between the United States and the Russian Federation on the underlying issues and their implications, perceived or otherwise, for the strategic balance between the two great nuclear powers. The third consequence is a consideration that the US sites could serve as an initial basis upon which a structure for the defence of Europe could be developed.