The NATO of the future will have to take account of the demanding situations that it has lived through in recent years and that, despite its ongoing desire for change, have to some extent clouded its outlook. These challenges have been operational, organisational and political. There is nothing really new in this, but the current juxtaposition of these challenges threatens to weaken the Atlantic organisation that emerged from the Cold War, perhaps even calling into question its very foundations. It is also time for France to regularise its military position within the Alliance.
The Future NATO
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, conceived during the Cold War to give body to the North Atlantic Alliance, has continued to evolve to take account of the new strategic situations with which the Allies have been faced since the end of the blocs and the Soviet collapse. After the two Strategic Concepts that followed on from this critical phase (those of Rome in November 1991 and Washington in March 1999), and two years before the probable emergence of a new concept in 2009 for the ‘sixtieth anniversary summit’, it is only right to re-examine the future of this organisation that France is prepared to regard with cool detachment or to rejoin militarily if, in the future, this is to the advantage of both itself and its Allies. Has NATO achieved the right balance between its members and their security concerns? Has it identified relevant and sustainable solutions to the problems that it has addressed? Has it been able to maintain or strengthen the strategic cohesion between its members? Does it yet have adequate elasticity and flexibility? The future NATO is clearly of interest to its members and clients as well as its partners who are monitoring developments carefully, in Moscow, Jerusalem, New Delhi, Tokyo or Buenos Aires.
But this NATO is faced with a wide range of challenges across many fields, whether organisational, operational or political, that it can scarcely deal with today.
Organisation and Structures
Let us begin with NATO’s structures and its organic relationships. Without going back over the question of the constructive dialogue that must take place within the Alliance between Americans and Europeans to ensure that it operates effectively and offers security to their mutual advantage, some serious questions merit attention.(1) Does the territorial military structure of the Alliance still make sense? Is it still possible to plan defence (especially technologies and capabilities)? Many other subjects could be analysed, such as financial resources, the European caucus, the latent competition between ESDI and ESDP,(2) or again US predominance in NATO structures. All are relevant.
Il reste 90 % de l'article à lire
