If we ask ourselves the key question what the significance and ultimate results of the meeting at St-Malo in 1998 were, we have to consider the fact that little progress could be made in the field of security and defence without a strong and determined agreement between the only two actors that can really aspire to the role of principal protagonists in Europe: France and the United Kingdom. For 45 years, European policy in this area effectively lay dormant until the time of St-Malo. The prevailing conditions during a particularly enthusiastic period in European politics allowed us to catch a glimpse of hope of real progress. After an intensive four-month period, between July and October 1999, the European partners produced a series of important global objectives under the so-called ‘Headline Goal’ agreement of the Helsinki Accord.

At that time it appeared that Europe could declare an element of self-determination: the reinforcement of European military capacities for the benefit of NATO and, maybe more significantly, in other cases where NATO may not necessarily want to become engaged. Here, then, was the potential for the EU to make military decisions and assume control of crisis management operations.

This initial enthusiasm gathered momentum and was present during the Pledging Conference in Brussels one year later during which member states and non-EU members proposed positive initiatives and contributions with which to give the EU a real operational capability. What has happened in the interim since that period of hope? In reality, much less than we had hoped for both for internal and external reasons and also due to a lack of strategic vision.