With the publication of the White Paper, a solemn rite under the Fifth Republic, the President of the Republic recently communicated to the nation and the Armed Forces his directives on security and defence. The aim of this article is to look at the consequences of some of his choices, and in particular to draw attention to some of the issues regarding the new function ‘knowledge and anticipation’. To quote St Augustine, ‘Rome has spoken; the case is concluded’. The guidelines have been laid down, and it is now up to the Armed Forces to follow them and, as the details are not spelt out, to interpret them effectively.
The Priority Given to Intelligence in the White Paper
In an environment in which the use of armed force by our troops is considered less and less acceptable, and where the budget allocation is unchanging (to give a positive spin), what can the military person do for the good of French forces according to the traditional formula? My straightforward answer is, ‘basically as before, but using fundamentally changed methods’. In the words of Prince Salina in Lampedusa’s The Leopard, ‘If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change.’
This general principle runs throughout the White Paper and is something that this writer will not try to summarise or comment upon, not wishing to compete with the extensive and deep reflection that it reveals. Here instead, we shall limit discussion to aspects of knowledge and anticipation, notably on the pre-eminent position given to intelligence. The latter was confirmed symbolically by the President’s visit to the DRM’s facilities in Creil on 17 June 2008, immediately after his talk to the forces at Porte de Versailles in Paris.(1)
This priority is both reasonable and logical. If our forces are to remain limited in number, if we reject the idea of combat in general and if we wish to restrict armed engagement, once it becomes inevitable, to smaller proportions, with a minimum of violence necessary to contain collateral effects whilst at the same time affording this reduced military capability the greatest possible effectiveness, it simply cannot be done without determined development of our intelligence capabilities. Despite the spin being given to the current format of the forces mentioned above, it is not really Goliath’s muscle that counts today: it is more David’s judgement and the accuracy of his weaponry in support of a just cause.
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