The shift of the world’s economic and geostrategic centre of gravity towards Asia faces India, one of the continent’s two major emerging powers, with a new and complex security equation. The Indian political and military élite accepts the definition of the country as an emerging power on the verge of becoming a great power, a conviction based on the country’s exceptional economic growth (8.2 per cent for the last half of 2010), its growing military strength and the increasing weight the country wields on the international scene. India’s geostrategic environment can be illustrated as three circles of internal, regional and external challenges. Internal security is still a central element of Indian security assessments: Naxalite terrorism, socio-political problems in the North-East and Kashmiri separatism are all threats to the nation’s stability that challenge the Indian authorities. At the regional level, New Delhi is confronted by the instability and activism of its Pakistani neighbour and by China’s growing might. Further afield, India wants to play a more important role on the international stage, which means being able to protect its interests by power projection and a presence in the main decision-making centres. This article discusses these second and third circles.

A Fragile Regional Environment: Rivalry with China and Pakistan

At regional level, Indo-Pakistani rivalry is a central element of Indian strategic calculations. Since 1947, India and Pakistan have fought each other in three major wars. In India, Pakistan is widely regarded as the chief factor of regional instability, as much because of its internal fragility as because of its support for terrorist movements, its military strength and its nuclear capability. Add to that the historic differences over the Kashmir question, a repeated stumbling block in any bilateral negotiation. India is worried that it will one day see a nuclear-armed Pakistan become a ‘failed state’, with all the consequences that that would entail for its national security. New Delhi believes, moreover, that the United States is not firm enough over the Pakistani Army and Secret Services’ support for anti-Indian terrorist groups like the Laskhar-e-Taiba and Hizbul Mujahideen. This is a constantly reiterated reproach addressed to Washington after every terrorist attack directed by Pakistani elements, as was the case in New Delhi in 2001 and Mumbai in 2008. In spite of its conventional military superiority, the Indian government feels partially disarmed by this American restraint which allows Pakistan to wage its proxy wars at minimal cost. The Indian response has to fit into the confined and shifting strategic space between the Pakistani nuclear threshold and an acceptable level of political results. Avoiding a Pakistani political meltdown and takeover by radical Islamists, whilst maintaining an effective deterrence are India’s two priority objectives in relation to its turbulent neighbour.

At both the regional and continental level, China would seem to be India’s major strategic rival. From the Indian point of view, Asia’s future geostrategic and security configuration will be shaped by the evolving Sino-Indian balance of power. In that context, where does India stand, in view of China’s greater economic, military and political weight? Whilst the two countries have since 1988 conducted a regular dialogue aimed at easing bilateral tensions and finding areas of agreement, ever since the 1962 defeat Indian leaders have tended to show a certain inferiority complex in regard to China. New Delhi’s attitude to Beijing today seems to be one of remaining in the race for influence in Asia, particularly in South and South-East Asia and in the Indian Ocean. As a result, India feels itself sidelined by China, and is aware of growing Chinese political and economic influence as well as a clear increase in its military capacity. The notion of a Chinese anti-Indian containment belt, or pearl necklace, as conceived by the American consultant agency Booz Allen and Hamilton, has made headway in Indian strategic thinking for some years. Indian strategy, therefore, consists of asserting itself on the sidelines, particularly in the Kashmir region and in the North-East. India recently deployed two squadrons of Su-30 Mk1 fighter-bombers in Assam to reinforce its presence and its strategic reach. The status of Arunachal Pradesh (which the Chinese call South Tibet) is still unclear, in spite of protracted negotiations. For many Indian experts, the Chinese Army is the driving force behind anti-Indian manoeuvres, and is pressing internally for the Arunachal Pradesh and Kashmir questions to be considered as top priorities of Chinese foreign policy. Moreover, for several decades Beijing has been supplying Pakistan with military technology (JF-17 fighters and Shaheen missiles) intended to reduce the imbalance of power in South Asia to India’s detriment. Quite logically, one of New Delhi’s priorities has been to counter the Sino-Pakistani axis, not least because in Azad Kashmir (Pakistani Kashmir) China has been making massive infrastructure investments, notably in the Karakorum Highway, the Jhelum Bridge and the Daimer Basha Dam. The Chinese PLA has deployed thousands of men there, particularly in the Gilgit Baltistan region. This feeling of an ‘anti-Indian axis’ is strengthened by Beijing’s repeated refusals to issue visas to Indian officers stationed in Kashmir. On a wider scale, China is often perceived as trying to hinder India from reaching higher political ground, in particular by opposing its admission to the UN Security Council and protesting against the exceptional status granted to India by Washington in nuclear matters.