The authors of this article recommend an adaptation of our air-ground operational doctrine to the conditions met in Afghanistan, indeed in Iraq. Inspired by US methods, they argue the need for Joint Terminal Attack Controllers, who call for and direct air support, in all units engaged on external operations.
Adapting our Air-Ground Operations Doctrine
In Afghanistan, just as in Normandy in 1944, air power plays a crucial role. The current campaign is joint at every level: aircraft and helicopters are frequently used to support ground forces in contact. The difference with Normandy is that there is no front line as such, but zones where insecurity is extreme. The notion of ‘contested zones’ is pertinent here.
The terrain in which the enemy operates is compartmented: on the one hand by a rugged landscape of arid mountains and valleys, and on the other by ‘green zones’ which are veritable artificial oases, with canals linking them to rivers. The houses, surrounded by the long mud walls which mark their compounds, remind one of the Norman bocage. In other words mutual support is difficult, above all at the human level, even when vehicle-borne.
The patrols which operate on the ground are of platoon size; they are rarely any larger due to the lack of combat infantry in theatre.(1) They are often out of range of their supporting artillery, which is (logically) deployed in safe areas.
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