Symbolic of a military strategy for France and Europe that will necessarily put the accent on space and the oceans to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century, the question of aircraft carriers is still generally misunderstood within France’s defence community. The reasons put forward for deferring a decision on the second carrier are not the fundamental ones. This issue has to be revisited to prepare for the decision in 2011 and avoid making a mistake like the decision on the Maginot Line.
The Second Aircraft Carrier: a Second Maginot line?
In an interview on RTL at the end of May, and in anticipation of the publication of the White Paper on defence and national security, the President of the Republic kicked the question of [France’s] second aircraft carrier into touch in just a few words: no decision before 2011 or 2012—in other words, at the end of his current term of office. This decision not to decide is in effect a decision to prolong a strategic impasse, closely paralleling that of the Maginot Line.
Sadly, the history of France is punctuated by incoherence in strategic choices, which has often led to tragic consequences.
The defensive philosophy of the much-vilified Maginot Line was highly questionable once France had made commitments to defending the new countries of Central Europe, and in an era when tanks and aircraft had become all-important. It was hardly any less so even at the time of its conception and construction. The Line had a fundamental strategic fault in that it did not cover the north-eastern border up to the North Sea. That it might have been bypassed does not seem to have been considered: we all know what happened.
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