The American nuclear landscape in Europe could change in the coming months. The signs are already there, and a new strategic posture will have major implications for the Europeans as well as for the visibility of France’s deterrent force. Nonetheless, the Georgian crisis, tensions with Iran, Russian muscle flexing and NATO’s line cast doubt on the idea that a partial or even complete withdrawal of American B-61 bombs could be on the agenda at the Alliance’s 60th anniversary in April 2009.
Moves to Withdraw Nuclear Weapons from NATO?
This is a provocative subject but the question must still be faced. Firstly the title: it has the advantage of brevity but does not reflect reality. The nuclear weapons concerned are American; NATO does not possess any effective, collective and political capability for their ‘employment’, and the final decision remains with the proprietor nation. Agreements relating to their storage and security are bilateral with each host nation and the whole is organized to ensure that the nation holding the warhead arming codes remains the only one to possess total control. The dual key system is more a political safeguard for the few allied nations in respect of the ‘loan’ of their pilot/delivery aircraft system in the context of a possible nuclear gesture rather than a sort of code-sharing.
Which is where the limitations are. Nuclear weapons cannot be shared and deterrence in a NATO context involves first and foremost acceptance of a common language, consideration of the status of the nuclear threat throughout the world, the adoption of operating procedures and doctrines as well as nuclear policy and its evolution within the arsenal of the primary ally. To enliven the debate, French and British nuclear policies both enrich this dialogue and complicate the perception of the credibility principle that might be held by ‘potential adversaries’. This principle is an essential element in the persuasion game, in the knowledge that nuclear deterrence is a particular form of interdiction with the interaction between intention and capability echoing the principles of deception.
Departure of US Nuclear Weapons?
Are US nuclear weapons about to leave? In other words, will the thermonuclear B-61 variable-yield weapons be leaving their protected storage under the concrete fighter-bomber shelters of the United States and its allies in Europe? Are we going to find a European nuclear environment occupied solely by the nuclear forces of France (SSBN and aircraft) and the United Kingdom (SSBN), not to mention Russian nuclear forces? The US nuclear potential would henceforth become either stealthy (SSBN) or stored at home, able to return to theatre in a crisis situation (the reconstitution strategy).
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