In 2010, their ninth year of war in Afghanistan, the Americans have adopted a new, last-chance strategy of counter-insurgency, based on joint civil-military action. This new strategy is strongly influenced by the research of French analysts in the 1960s; it has little chance of success, since it cannot transcend military and political contradictions.
Year 9 in Afghanistan
With the gradual adoption of a new strategy and the arrival of reinforcements, the year 2010 represents the last opportunity to get out of the mess in which Operation Enduring Freedom finds itself in Afghanistan. The operation began following the 11 September 2001 attacks.
Since 2008 the politico-military situation has gone steadily downhill, affecting both American and international public opinion. The situation puts the spotlight on an American command structure heavily committed to a solution based on a counter-insurgency strategy developed in the 1960s and doomed to failure.
Counter-Insurgency Strategy
When developing his strategy, General David Petraeus, the Commander-in-Chief of American and NATO forces engaged in the Middle East and Central Asia, was strongly influenced by the work of David Galula and Roger Trinquier.(1) He shared his thinking with General Stanley McChrystal, commander of Western troops in the Afghan theatre, consisting of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), NATO forces and the embryonic Afghan National Army (ANA). The new counter-insurgency strategy runs directly counter to the strategy of massive repression practised by the Americans up to 2008. It changes the methods and modalities of combat operations conducted by the coalition to further the political aim, which remains the installation of a Western-style parliamentary democracy.
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