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  • Revue n° 716 February 2009
  • ESDP in the Second Half of 2008

ESDP in the Second Half of 2008

Fabien Terpan, "ESDP in the Second Half of 2008 " Revue n° 716 February 2009

The results of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in the second half of 2008 were rather untypical, in that it was France, the driving force behind ESDP, which held the presidency of the Union during this period. While confronting the Georgian crisis, the French EU presidency set out to tackle the issue of crisis management capabilities. In addition, the member states developed collaborative initiatives that could appreciably reinforce ESDP’s potential.

Within the European Union, France is undoubtedly the member state that has contributed the most to European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Along with the United Kingdom, it was in at the beginning of the project(1) and its contribution in institutional and capability terms has been considerable. ESDP in the second half of 2008 took on a particular character by virtue of this French influence and because the French presidency of the EU made defence one of its high priorities, along with agriculture, immigration and the environment. The previous French presidency, during the first half of 2001, disappointed a number of observers, as much because of the lack of resources devoted to it as the modesty of the results achieved. Great things were therefore expected of Paris this time, in a political context marked by the need for a relaunch of the European project after the rejection of the constitutional treaty, and ESDP in particular. In addition, Europeans were curious to see what direction the new occupant of the Elysée would take, especially on security and defence matters. It is worth remembering that the French EU presidency began in July 2008, just a few days after the publication of France’s new White Paper on defence and national security, which announced a shift in the French position on relations with NATO.

Apart from the difficulties of the financial and economic situation, President Nicolas Sarkozy’s first test as the head of the EU was the Russo-Georgian crisis, from August 2008 on. The need for a rapid reaction to a conflict situated at the Union’s gates obviously upset the planned French programme. It also provided an opportunity to test the EU’s capacity for crisis management, using CFSP-ESDP.

The adoption in December 2008 by the European Council of a declaration on the strengthening of ESDP(2) reflects the voluntarism of the French EU presidency. In conformity with the views expressed by France, the heads of state and government decided to breathe new life into the ESDP. In fact, the content of the declaration and its supporting documents does not involve any really fundamental changes. To go beyond the current state of preparedness for crisis management, the member states decided to accelerate the capability strengthening process. In this they followed the pragmatic approach indicated by the French presidency. The presidency also tried, but with less conviction and less success, to make progress with the idea of strategic autonomy for the EU.

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