The nuclear debate is going to resurface for several reasons. President Obama cannot escape this, despite seeking to position Hillary Clinton between his preoccupation with the domestic situation and international problems. Just as France cannot itself ignore the situation, having tested a nuclear device prior to 1 January 1967⁽¹⁾ and thereby becoming officially classified as a nuclear weapons state (NWS). Of course, France has less need of deterrence than it has for self-confidence, civic pride and patriotism. However, with all that has been done to deprive it of this indispensable tool, the nuclear weapon remains for France a substitute for greatness, insurance against a possible worst-case scenario, but one that cannot protect against other threats. France cannot do without its greatly reduced nuclear arsenal, and it must therefore ensure that it retains a voice in discussions about changes in global concepts.

All this is to a large extent a consequence of changes in US strategic thinking about the global environment, but also in response to significant internal events, such as elections or the manifestos of major political figures.

The first reason for the re-emergence of the debate, which had subsided following the end of the Euromissile problem, is the urgent need to replace or renew bilateral agreements with Russia, at a time when differences of opinion between the two countries are reaching worrying levels. The independence accorded to Kosovo because the Albanians had ‘cleansed’ it of its legitimate Serb inhabitants, while Russian communities are prevented from achieving a simple form of independence, and the moves to invite Ukraine and Georgia to join NATO, have all revived a form of paranoia within Russia. With the START-1 treaty due to expire in 2009, it is vital to renew the intermediate-range nuclear weapons (INF) treaty as well as that (CFE) on the balance of conventional armed forces in Europe. The threat of Russian rejection of these two restrictive treaties leaves the old continent hostage to the consequences of US adventurism. The installation in the Czech Republic of an old radar from the anti-ballistic missile trials range in the Pacific, and in Poland of interceptor systems, although too few in number to threaten the Russian arsenal, has for the Russians been proof positive of a grand strategy to bring their country down. The main aim of the new US President must therefore be to soothe the tension.