From the beginning, France was one of the pioneering countries in the field of disarmament, an activity that occurred from time to time and now happens mainly in a European framework. However, France’s nuclear posture often seems conservative.
France and Disarmament From One Century to Another
Disarmament, in the broadest sense (non-proliferation, arms control, humanitarian disarmament, confidence-building measures, arms reduction and disarmament in the strict sense of the word), and in whatever framework (unilateral measures, bilateral or multilateral negotiations) is a subject of particular interest for France. Contrary to popular belief, French diplomacy has always been a major player on the disarmament scene, and has pursued an active and multifaceted policy since the time of the League of Nations. From the efforts of Jules Moch in Geneva(1) defending a non-proliferation regime, through criticism of the American-Soviet duopoly, France has displayed a degree of activism in a great number of initiatives, for instance the French plans of 1978 and 1991, President Mitterrand’s speech to the United Nations in 1983, or more recently President Sarkozy’s speech at Cherbourg in 2008). France is one of the handful of countries with all-round expertise in disarmament questions that structured the debate in the twentieth century.
For the coming period, it is worth examining whether the disarmament agenda will allow France to keep this role, or whether it will find itself increasingly on the defensive on account of the progress—temporary or lasting—of the nuclear disarmament theme.
France and Disarmament: a Constrained, Atypical Player
In disarmament negotiations, France has always sought to reconcile its interests as a military and nuclear power with its diplomatic priorities which have led it to favour one or other negotiation, or to abandon certain types of weapon. In this respect, France set itself apart from other foreign ministries that traditionally put disarmament at the heart of their foreign policy, as a moral imperative. In this category we find several Western powers (Sweden, Ireland, Austria, Norway and New Zealand) and some of the larger Southern countries like Mexico and South Africa that are usually not tied by strong security constraints such as membership of military alliances or a particularly challenging security environment. At the other end of the spectrum, most of the major strategic players have usually built their disarmament diplomacy essentially around the defence of their own security interests. Most of the countries represented in the major multilateral forums follow the general line and subscribe to the views of the regional groupings (for example, non-aligned, Western group or European Union) to which they belong without displaying any great activity in preparing their positions.
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